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INTRODUCTION
If the nineteenth century was a world of privacy and prudery, a world of closed
doors and drawn blinds, both literally and figuratively, then the world of the
twenty-first century is the world of the one-way mirror, the world of the all1
seeing eye.
See EVERYTHING on the network. With a complete historical record, there
2
are no more secrets; every action taken on the network is recorded and stored.

Imagine your life as a line of events. Color an event red if a business
records personal information about it; otherwise, color it blue.3 How “red” is
your line? Very. “[I]t has become increasingly rare to deal with any . . .
private-sector organization without generating and relying upon a database of
personal information.”4 The consequence is a loss of informational privacy.
Informational privacy is a matter of control. It is “the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others.”5 The degree of
control we once enjoyed has vanished.6 Advances in information-processing

1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 272 (2007).
2. Top 10 Reasons for Complete Network Visibility, SOLERA NETWORKS, http://www.solera
networks.com/company/resources/top-ten (last visited Jan. 2, 2011). Deep packet inspection
technology allows one’s ISP to view virtually all the unencrypted content one sends over the
Internet. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417,
1437–39 (2009).
3. The image is adapted from JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 32–33 (2007).
4. James B. Rule, Toward Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions,
54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183, 183 (2004).
5. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (2d prtg. 1967). See also U.S. Dep’t of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“[B]oth the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of
information concerning his or her person.”); RULE, supra note 3, at 3 (defining “privacy as the
exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on one’s self”); A. Michael Froomkin,
The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (“I will use ‘informational privacy’
as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself.”).
6. The erosion began in the 1950s with the development of credit reporting practices. See
RULE, supra note 3, at 99. For a fuller discussion, compare Priscilla M. Regan, The United
States, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 50, 55 (James B. Rule &
Graham Greenleaf eds., 2008) (noting the development of the computer in the 1960s triggered an
interest in informational privacy). Richard Posner’s summary is succinct and accurate:
[U]ntil quite recently the information that people voluntarily disclosed to vendors,
licensing bureaus, hospitals, public libraries, and so forth, was scattered, fugitive (because
the bulkiness of paper records usually causes them to be discarded as soon as they lose
their value to the enterprise), and searchable only with great difficulty. So although one
had voluntarily disclosed private information on innumerable occasions to sundry
recipients, one retained as a practical matter a great deal of privacy. But with digitization,
not only can recorded information be retained indefinitely at little cost, but also the
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technology now give others considerable power to determine when personal
information is collected, how it is used, and to whom it is distributed. Privacy
advocates sound the alarm in regard to both the governmental and private
sectors.7 I focus entirely on the latter and, within that, exclusively on
commercial interactions. Private sector commercial transactions merit separate
consideration. Not only do they raise complex and important issues, they also
have not been as extensively examined as governmental intrusions.8
Privacy advocates raise a diverse array of concerns: “[T]heorists have
proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy, friendship, dignity,
individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development,
creativity, independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of
thought, democracy, reputation, and psychological well-being.”9 The diversity
of concerns reflects the remarkably broad effect of the power others now have
over one’s personal information. One important reason the effects are so far
reaching is that information-processing practices now
share a distinctive and sociologically crucial quality: they not only collect and
record details of personal information; they also are organized to provide
bases for action toward the people concerned. Systematically harvested
personal information, in other words, furnishes bases for institutions to
determine what treatment to mete out to each individual. . . .
Mass
surveillance is a distinctive and consequential feature of our times. Whether

information held by different merchants, insurers, and government agencies can readily be
pooled, opening the way to assembling all the recorded information concerning an
individual in a single digital file that can easily be retrieved and searched. It should soon
be possible—maybe it is already possible—to create comprehensive electronic dossiers
for all Americans, similar to the sort of dossier the FBI compiles when it conducts
background investigations of applicants for sensitive government employment or
investigates criminal suspects. The difference is that the digitized dossier that I am
imagining would be continuously updated.
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248 (2008).
7. Three recent books illustrate the tenor of the literature: JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE
LOST RIGHT, at xi (2008) (“Intrusion is commonplace. Every single individual in today’s society
is at risk.”); RULE, supra note 3, at 200 (warning of the “endless erosion of privacy”); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 4 (2008) (“[T]he profound proliferation of new information
technologies during the twentieth century . . . made privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the
world.”).
8. The last 300 years of political philosophy have emphasized the critical role of privacy in
limiting the power of the state, and although scholars may disagree about how, and how much, to
protect privacy, by now we surely all agree that allowing the state to reach too deeply into its
citizens’ lives puts freedom at risk. Recent examples include: MILLS, supra note 7; RULE, supra
note 3; SOLOVE, supra note 7; Froomkin, supra note 5; Jed Rubenfeld, The End Of Privacy, 61
STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008).
9. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98. See also John Collette, Role Demands, Privacy and
Psychological Well-Being, 30 INT’L J. OF SOC. PSYCHIATRY 222, 223 (1984) (examining the
negative effects on women from loss of privacy).
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carried out by government agencies or private-sector organizations, it shapes
10
the ways we approach major institutions and our treatment at their hands.

I assume that we should impose limits on “mass surveillance”—on what James
B. Rule defines
as the use of “systematically harvested personal
information, . . . to determine what treatment to mete out to each individual.”11
I will not argue for this assumption; I rely instead on the arguments and
examples offered in the privacy literature. My question is how we should limit
mass surveillance.
Setting limits is no simple task. Increased information processing power
yields significant benefits, including increased availability of relevant
information, increased economic efficiency, and improved security.12 Any
adequate account of how to set limits must explain how to balance the benefits
against the loss of information privacy. Many nonetheless find the solution
obvious: require consent.13 That is, require businesses to present consumers
with relevant information (in some specified fashion) and then to secure
agreement to proceed with the transaction.14 I will call this a “consent
requirement,” although what is actually required is just the presentation of
information accompanied by some consumer action interpreted as agreement.15

10. RULE, supra note 3, at 14.
11. Id.
12. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1217–18 (1998) (noting that allowing the processing of personal information makes
commerce more efficient, prevents fraud, promotes transparency, and increases the relevant
information businesses send consumers while decreasing the irrelevant information). See also
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 86 (2008) (“[P]olicy decisions frequently counterpose privacy
against two other powerful values: efficiency and security.”). Paul Ohm contends that privacy
scholars have overestimated the security benefits of processing personal information. Ohm,
supra note 2, at 1466–68.
13. See, e.g., RULE, supra note 3, at 196. Notice and consent (either by opt-in or opt-out) is
required by the fair information practice principles. Fair Information Practice Principles, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last updated June 25, 2007)
[hereinafter FTC]. These principles were recently affirmed at the 31st International Conference
of Privacy and Data Protection, which culminated in the signing of the Madrid Declaration. THE
MADRID DECLARATION (2009), available at http://thepublicvoice.org/TheMadridPrivacyDeclara
tion.pdf. Despite their popularity, consent requirements have also sparked considerable criticism.
See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 2, at 1474–77; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32
CONN. L. REV. 815, 822–23 (2000) (noting the criticism but endorsing a limited consent
requirement).
14. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 112 (2008).
15. As Paul Schwartz notes, “when a Web site says something about its data processing
practices—even if this statement is vague or reveals poor practice—the visitor to the site is
deemed to be in agreement with these practices so long as she sticks around. This summary,
despite its ironic tone, is no exaggeration.” Schwartz, supra note 13, at 824.
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A consent requirement not only appears to guarantee control over personal
information, it also yields an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and
competing concerns.16 The overall pattern of giving or withholding consent
appears to define an acceptable line between permissible and impermissible
uses of personal information.
The apparent virtues of a consent requirement are an illusion. We cannot
rely on a consent requirement to ensure an adequate degree of informational
privacy. This is not to deny that the goal should be to ensure an adequate
degree of free and informed consent. Informational privacy is, after all, the
ability to control what information others collect about a person and how they
use and distribute it.17 It is difficult to see how such control can be achieved
other than through freely giving or withholding informed consent. But, it is
one thing to present information and secure agreement; it is quite another to
actually obtain free and informed consent. My claim is that the former does
not—and indeed in practice cannot—ensure the latter.18 The key to achieving
free and informed consent lies instead in informational norms.
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the collection, use, and
distribution of personal information.19 Informational norms explain why, for
example, you expect your pharmacist to inquire about the drugs you are taking
but not about whether you are happy in your marriage. Norm-governed
exchanges not only implement acceptable tradeoffs between informational
privacy and competing goals, they also ensure that consumers give free and
informed consent to those tradeoffs. This is the rationale for focusing on
informational norms, as they are in fact the means by which to make the
tradeoffs and give free and informed consent to those tradeoffs.20 These claims
require one qualification: they hold only under ideal conditions.21 The
qualification does not deprive the claims of interest, as it simply shows that the
interest is normative, not empirical. The conditions—called ideal transaction
conditions—define a normative goal, an ideal we should strive to approximate
in practice. Current practice unfortunately fails to adequately approximate this
ideal.22 Lack of norms is one key reason for this failure. The rapid advance in
information processing technology has outstripped the relatively slow
evolution of social norms in a wide range of important cases. The obvious
16. FTC, supra note 13.
17. See WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138
(2004).
20. See infra Part I.
21. Richard Warner, Turned On Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in
Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 6 (2008).
22. See, e.g., infra Part II (discussing the claim that we fall short of the ideal is the claim that
there is an imperfection in the market in the context of law and economics).
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response is to create the necessary norms. What combination of legal
regulation, market, and social factors will most effectively do so? That is the
critical question, and the question with which I conclude this essay.
Part I defines the relevant concept of a norm. It also introduces the first of
the four assumptions characterizing ideal transaction conditions and argues
that, given that assumption, norm-governed exchanges are an acceptable
tradeoff. The argument assumes that profit-motive driven businesses conform
to the relevant norms, and the objection is that businesses will violate norms
when doing so increases profit. Part II answers that objection by adapting a
well-known law and economics argument to complete the characterization of
the ideal transaction conditions and to argue that, under such conditions, the
profit-maximizing strategy is to conform to applicable informational norms.
Part III contends that, under ideal transaction conditions, consumers give free
and informed consent to norm-created tradeoffs. Part IV offers four examples
in which technologically enhanced information processing practices are
unconstrained by appropriate informational norms and, hence, fall short of the
ideal. The consequence is a loss of informational privacy. In the context of
the law and economics argument developed in Part II, the claim that we fall
short of the ideal is the claim that there is an imperfection in the market. In the
law and economics literature, market imperfections are considered
imperfections because they cause inefficiency;23 the market imperfections
illustrated by the four examples, on the other hand, are imperfections because
they significantly reduce informational privacy. Part V rejects a consent
requirement as an adequate solution to such shortfalls. Part VI argues that our
goal should be to create the informational norms necessary to adequately
constrain private sector information processing.
I. INFORMATIONAL NORMS
I begin with a typical example of a norm-governed transaction. Suppose
Vicky purchases wine from a retail store. She makes a number of assumptions
about what information the store will collect and how it will use and distribute
the information. The assumptions include collection, use, and distribution.
Collection: Vicky assumes that the store will not request information about her
liver function, record the kind of clothes she is wearing, or record whether she
is in the store with her spouse or another companion. Use: She assumes that
the store will not analyze her patterns of wine buying to predict her sexual

23. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 5, at 1501–03; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) (citing PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E.
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS, WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)); Peter P. Swire, Efficient Confidentiality for Privacy,
Security, and Confidential Business Information (Brookings-Wharton Papers on Fin. Servs. Ser.,
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=398340.
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orientation—even if direct marketing researchers have discovered correlations
between patterns of wine selection and sexual orientation.24 Distribution:
When she consults the store about a party she is planning, she assumes that the
store will not publish the party details on its web site. In general, Vicky
assumes the store will only collect, analyze, and distribute information in ways
she regards as acceptable. From now on, let us shorten “the collection, use,
and distribution of personal information” to “the processing of personal
information.”
We typically assume acceptable processing of personal information occurs
in a wide range of settings—including, for example, coffee houses, auto
mechanics, universities, restaurants, and small grocers. We do so because we
assume the businesses conform to relevant informational norms. This raises
four questions. First, what are the relevant informational norms? Second, why
is information processing consistent with those norms acceptable? Third, why
think businesses will conform to the norms? Finally, why believe that
individuals give free and informed consent to the norm-permitted information
processing? I consider each question in turn. An essential preliminary is the
definition of the relevant notion of a norm.
A.

Norms Defined

A norm is a sanction-supported behavioral regularity in a group of people,
where the regularity exists in part because each group member thinks that he or
she ought, other things being equal, to act in accord with that regularity.25
Imagine: you are about to enter an elevator in which others are already present.
Where do you stand? The norm is to maximize the distance between you and
the person nearest you. As a further example, imagine you are making a
comment during a roundtable discussion; how long should you talk before it is
someone else’s turn? You should talk only as long as is appropriate (in a
contextually determined sense of “appropriate”). As a final example, picture a
narrow corridor in which a lawyer with an oversized briefcase encounters a
parent with a baby in a stroller walking in the other direction; in order for one

24. Lest this seem too fanciful, consider the direct marketing “discovery in a recent
presidential campaign that buyers of a particular car-washing product proved enormously
susceptible to Republican campaign appeals.” RULE, supra note 3, at 104.
25. See Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence
of Social Norms?, in SOCIAL NORMS 394, 403 (Michael Hechtor & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001)
(citing Robert Sugden, Normative Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions and
Norms, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 73, 78–79 (Ben-Ner Avner & Louis
Putterman eds., 1998)). There are various definitions of norms, and it would be a mistake to
wonder which one is “correct.” There are just different concepts serving different theoretical
purposes. The text defines the concept of a norm that serves my purposes. See, for example,
Warner, supra note 21, at 8, for its use in other contexts.
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to pass, the other must make room. The norm is that (in most cases at least)
the lawyer should make room for the parent.
The sanctions for violating norms in these examples consist of disapproval
and its consequences.26 Sanctions typically play a role in explaining
conformity to the norm.27 More fully, explanations for conformity spread out
over a continuum. At one extreme, a person conforms only in order to avoid
sanctions (e.g., avoid eating meat with a salad fork solely to avoid the
disapproval of one’s etiquette-obsessed friends). At the other extreme, fear of
sanctions plays no role in explaining conformity; rather, a person conforms
solely because he thinks that conformity realizes a state of affairs regarded as
good (respect for the opinions of others, for instance, in the roundtable
discussion example). In between, conformity results from a mix, in varying
degrees, of both factors. The essential point is that, across the entire
continuum, it is true to say that one thinks he ought to conform. The “ought” is
purely prudential at the “conform only to avoid sanctions” end and entirely
non-prudential at the “conform solely to realize a good state of affairs” end.
1.

Informational Norms

Informational norms are norms that govern the collection, use, and
As the communications theorist Helen
distribution of information.28
Nissenbaum notes, informational norms
[g]enerally . . . circumscribe the type or nature of information about various
individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even
demanded to be revealed. In medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details
of our physical condition or, more specifically, the patient shares information
about his or her physical condition with the physician but not vice versa;
among friends we may pour [sic] over romantic entanglements (our own and
those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial information;
with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to
29
discuss work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.

26. I focus on “sanctions” as penalties; norms may also be associated with “sanctions” that
consist in approval or some other benefit (a “sanction” in the sense of ratifying or approving).
27. See Hechter & Opp, supra note 25, at 403–04 (citing A.L. Epstein, Sanctions, in 14
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, at 1 (David L. Sills ed., 1968)).
28. See Nissenbaum, supra note 19, at 138.
29. Id. See also Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem
of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 581–82 (1998) (“For the myriad transactions,
situations and relationships in which people engage, there are norms—explicit and implicit—
governing how much information and what type of information is fitting for them.”); James
Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 328 (1975) (“[T]he sort of
relationship people have to one another involves a conception of how it is appropriate for them to
behave with each other, and what is more, a conception of the kind and degree of knowledge
concerning one another which it is appropriate for them to have.”).
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As the reference to friends and romantic entanglements illustrates,
informational norms govern commercial and non-commercial interactions.30
In the commercial context, informational norms are instances of the following
pattern: a business may collect, use, and distribute information only as is
“Appropriateness” is determined
appropriate for that business.31
contextually.32 Over a wide range of cases, group members share a complex
set of values that leads them to more or less agree in their particular contextual
judgments of appropriateness.33
Consumer and business transactions occur against a background of
informational norms,34 I will not argue for this assumption. I rely instead on
the work of Nissenbaum and others.35 An example of an informational norm is
in order, however. Vicky’s wine store visit serves the purpose.36 The relevant
norm is that the store may process information only in ways appropriately
related to the store’s role as a seller of wine. The first point to note is that the
norm defines a tradeoff between informational privacy and competing
concerns. The competing concerns include increased economic efficiency,
30. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 19, at 138.
31. See, e.g., Adam Barth et al., Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and
Applications, in 2006 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 184, 186; Nissenbaum,
supra note 19, at 138.
32. See Barth et al., supra note 31, at 186.
33. As Michael Zimmer notes, “within each context, the relevant agents, the types of
information, and transmissions principles combine to shape the governing informational norms.”
Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory of “Contextual Integrity” to
Clarify the Privacy Threats of Google’s Quest for the Perfect Search Engine, 3 J. OF BUS. &
TECH. L. 109, 115 (2008) (citing Barth et al., supra note 31, at 186).
34. Norms vary from group to group. For simplicity, however, I take the relevant group to
be all United States consumers. Norm variation has been studied in the contractual context. In
the case of warranties, for example, higher income consumers may prefer higher prices and
longer warranties while lower income consumers may prefer lower prices and shorter warranties.
See William R. Darden & C.P. Rao, A Linear Covariate Model of Warranty Attitudes and
Behaviors, 16 J. MARKETING RES. 466, 475 (1979).
35. In addition to Nissenbaum, relevant theorists include: PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D.
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992); MICHAEL PHILIPS, BETWEEN
UNIVERSALISM AND SKEPTICISM: ETHICS AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT (1994); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373
(2000); Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and
Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
232 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Jeroen van den Hoven, Privacy and the
Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing, COMP. & SCI., Sept. 1997, at 33, reprinted in READINGS
IN CYBERETHICS 430 (Richard A. Spinello & Herman T. Tavani eds., 2001); Robert C. Post, The
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV.
957 (1989); Rachels, supra note 29; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
36. See supra pp. 1052–53.
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improved security, improved inventory control, marketing, business planning,
and better customer relationships.37 The norm promotes these ends by
permitting the processing of some personal information; it strikes a balance
between promoting these ends and promoting informational privacy by
permitting the processing of only some information and only for certain
purposes.
The key question is, why is the wine store norm a norm at all? Why, that
is, is it a sanction-supported regularity to which we think we ought to
conform? The answer here provides a template for answering the same
question in more controversial cases later. The relevant regularity exists: wine
stores typically process information only in appropriate ways. They do not, for
example, request information about liver functions, publish details about
customer parties on the store web site, or analyze buying patterns to determine
sexual orientation. The regularity is also sanction-supported. The sanction for
the wine store’s violation is lost business; customers would tend to desert a
store they discovered engaged in such practices.38 The sanction for consumer
non-conformity is the inconvenience of always paying cash and the loss of
store discounts and other advantages that require identifying oneself.39
Conformity benefits consumers and society as a whole by promoting more
efficient businesses that better serve consumers’ needs.40 The price we pay for
these benefits is merely allowing businesses to process personal information
within norm-imposed constraints—constraints that ensure the processing is
acceptable.41 In light of these facts, we think (or would after adequate
reflection think) we are better off if we conform; therefore, we decide that we
ought to conform.

37. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
38. See James. R. Averill, Studies on Anger and Aggression: Implications for Theories of
Emotion, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1145, 1149 (1983) (noting that violation of norms in an
exchange provokes anger and may lead to the termination of the exchange); Janice Tsai et al., The
Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, INFO.
SYS. RES., ePub ahead of print Feb. 19, 2010, at 2, 15, http://isr.journal.informs.org/cgi/reprint/
isre.1090.0260v1 (“Our results suggest that individuals are willing to pay a premium for privacy
when privacy information is made prominent and intuitive. . . . We found that participants
provided with salient privacy information took that information into consideration, making
purchases from websites offering medium or high levels of privacy.”).
39. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
41. See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENGAGING
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 164 (James Waldo et al. eds.,
2007).
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Value-Justified Norms

Business information processing practices are inadequately constrained by
informational norms. The problem is that the rapid increase in information
processing has outpaced the evolution of norms, leading to a lack norms in
many important cases.42 To stop the critique here, however, would be to
overlook another crucial way in which we lack appropriate norms. Across a
wide range of significant cases, informational norms do exist, but they are not
consistent with our values; they are not value-justified.43 In such cases, we do
not lack norms per se, but we do lack value-justified norms. What, then, is a
value-justified norm? And, why does it matter whether a norm is valuejustified?
To answer the first question, consider that we typically conform to norms
without much thought; when you step into an elevator, for example, you just
unreflectively stand in the appropriate spot. You think you ought to stand
there, but you do not worry or wonder about the justification for that “ought.”
But you could justify it if you reflected on the norm under ideal conditions
(including having sufficient time, information, lack of bias, and so on).44 You
could justify the balance the norm strikes between ‘not feeling crowded’ and
being able to use the elevator when it arrives. Roughly speaking, a norm is
value-justified when one can, in light of one’s values, justify the norm.
This is “rough speaking” because justification is a matter of degree. One
might, for example, regard the elevator norm as justified but also think that the
following alternative is even more justified: maximize the distance from your
nearest neighbor and do not enter the elevator unless that distance is at least
three inches. It is essential to take degrees of justification into account to
arrive at an explanation of value-justification that will serve our purposes in
what follows. Thus, let us define a value-justified norm: a norm is valuejustified when, in light of the values of all (or almost all) members of the group
in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any
alternative.45 It is worth emphasizing the requirement of justification, in light
of the values of all (or almost all) members of the group in which the norm
obtains; this plays an important role later in the argument that, under ideal

42. See, e.g., id. at 215–16 (discussing the informational processing concerns surrounding
the mapping of the human genome).
43. Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9.
44. The appeal to reasoning under appropriate conditions to justify normative conclusions
begins (at least) with Aristotle. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin
Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts Press, 19th prtg. 1980). For a modern exposition and defense of this
approach, see generally STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983).
45. See Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9.
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transaction conditions, all (or almost all) consumers freely consent to normimplemented tradeoffs.46
My critique of current information processing practices focuses on a
particular type of failure of value-justification. The following example
illustrates the relevant type and serves as a useful reference point in developing
the critique. Until the 1970s, the norm among National Hockey League
players was not to wear a helmet.47 The norm remained despite the clear risk
of severe head injury48 and the majority vote in a secret ballot where players
said that the league should require them to wear helmets.49 “One player
summed up the feelings of many: ‘It’s foolish not to wear a helmet. But I
don’t—because the other guys don’t. I know that’ [sic] silly, but most of the
players feel the same way.’”50 Thus, most players preferred that most
players—themselves included—wear a helmet but preferred not to wear a
helmet if most others did not. The players conformed to the no-helmet norm to
avoid two sanctions: non-helmet-wearing players’ perception that helmetwearers lacked toughness, and a small loss in playing effectiveness against
non-helmet-wearing players.51 In light of the sanctions, each player thought he
ought to conform. The result was that it remained a norm not to wear a helmet
until 1979, when the League required all players to wear helmets.52 Despite its
persistence, the “no helmet” norm was not value-justified. There was an
alternative the players regarded as far better justified: that all players should
wear helmets.
This suffices for an explanation of value-justification. Now, why does
value-justification matter? The hockey helmet example shows why. The nohelmet norm defined a tradeoff between the risk of head injury, on the one
hand, and on the other, retaining peripheral vision and appearing tough. When
they conformed to this norm, the players accepted the tradeoff—even though
they regarded another norm (all players wear helmets) and another tradeoff
(reduced risk of head injury) as far better justified. This is why valuejustification matters: conformity to a norm that lacks value-justification means
acting contrary to one’s values. This same pattern appears in the lack-ofvalue-justification norms examined in Part IV. We are trapped in conformity

46. The point is to avoid a “majoritarian bias.” The view is not that if a majority find a norm
value-justified, then all who conform do so freely.
47. See NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, THE HISTORY OF HOCKEY EQUIPMENT (2002),
available at http://stars.nhl.com/ext/pdf/NHL_UniformBooklet.pdf.
48. Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A
Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 381 (1973).
49. James Surowiecki, Fuel for Thought, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2007, at 25, 25.
50. Schelling, supra note 48, at 381 (quoting The Stick that Sickens, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6,
1969, at 95, 95).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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to those norms even though our values lead us to regard alternative norms as
far better justified.
B.

Why is Norm-Consistent Information Processing Acceptable?

Why is information processing that is consistent with relevant
informational norms acceptable? Indeed, does not the immediately preceding
discussion show that this is not always true? When we are trapped in
conformity to a norm that lacks value-justification, we are trapped into acting
contrary to our values. How can that qualify as acceptable? My answer is that,
under ideal transaction conditions, information processing consistent with the
relevant norms is acceptable to the extent practice approximates the ideal. The
first step in defending this claim is to explain the relevant sense of
“acceptable.” “Acceptable” in this context means the following: normconsistent information processing is acceptable when (and only when) the
norm is value-justified. The first of the four assumptions characterizing the
ideal conditions—the norm completeness assumption—guarantees that norms
are value-justified.
The assumption is that value-justified norms govern all personal
information processing by businesses. The assumption is approximately true,
and its approximate truth ensures that the ideal it defines is a viable normative
guide, not an ideal so unattainable that it is irrelevant. A rich and varied set of
value-justified informational norms has arisen through centuries of information
exchanges between sellers and buyers. The current problem is that rapid
technological and economic change has outstripped the relatively slow
evolution of norms, thereby creating types of transactions that are not governed
by appropriate norms.53
I make two simplifying assumptions about norm completeness. First,
transactions are either entirely consistent or entirely inconsistent with
applicable norms. Consistency may be a matter of degree in practice. Second,
in regard to value-justification, the simplifying assumption is that our values
show either that we ought to act in accord with a given norm or that we ought
not. In practice, our values may leave questions undecided—showing neither
that we ought act in accord with a norm, nor showing that we ought not.
To summarize: norm completeness guarantees that transactions are
governed by value-justified informational norms; hence, given the assumption,
it follows that norm-consistent information processing is acceptable in the
sense defined. Some may object that this is just a bit of definitional sleight of
hand that glosses over an obvious problem. The apparent problem is that
people vary greatly in the sensitivity about informational privacy, so it is

53. See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, supra note 41, at 215–16.
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entirely possible, for example, that Vicky54 might prefer that the wine store not
collect any personal information about her at all—even when the relevant norm
allows the store to do so. What is the point of insisting that information
processing is acceptable in the sense defined if Vicky prefers a different
treatment? To see the point, consider that, as a member of the community in
which the norm obtains, Vicky herself accepts and generally adheres to the
norm. Thus, if she were to insist on being an exception to the norm, she would
be violating her own standards and demanding to be made an exception to a
norm that she regards as at least as well-justified as any alternative. One can
easily imagine Vicky insisting on her preferred treatment. But this just shows
that, like all of us, Vicky can be tempted by what she nonetheless thinks she
should not have.
II. WHY WILL BUSINESSES CONFORM TO NORMS?
Why think businesses will conform to the norms? Suppose, for example,
that wine stores could increase profits by surreptitiously using information
about buying patterns to determine their customers’ sexual orientation.55
Rational, profit-motive-driven businesses will violate the norm that prohibits
using information in that way.56
So won’t businesses often violate
informational norms? My answer is that, under ideal transaction conditions,
the profit-maximizing strategy for a business is to conform to applicable
informational norms.57 I begin with a summary of the argumentof this claim:
(1) some buyers will notice when a business violates a norm; (2) buyers will
not buy from a business they perceive as norm-inconsistent; (3) businesses can
discriminate between buyers who will, and those who will not, detect norminconsistencies; therefore, (4) norm-conformity is the profit-maximizing
strategy.58 In presenting the argument, I assume that both businesses and
consumers know all relevant norms, and know what tradeoffs they

54. See supra pp. 6–7.
55. Cf., e.g., RULE, supra note 3, at 104 (discussing a direct marketing “discovery in a recent
presidential campaign that buyers of a particular car-washing product proved enormously
susceptible to Republican campaign appeals”).
56. See, e.g., Elisabetta Povoledo, Italian Judge Cites Profits as Justifying a Google
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B8 (discussing a conviction of Google employees for
violating Italian privacy laws in order to profit from a video of an autistic boy being bullied).
57. The argument is adapted from the influential article by Schwartz and Wilde. Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). My argument proposes a
normative ideal: Schwartz and Wilde in contrast make empirical claims. It also bears emphasis
that my argument concerns informational norms, not—as with Schwartz and Wilde—terms in
standard-form contracts. I focus on terms in Richard Warner, Turned on Its Head?: Norms,
Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in Internet Contracting, supra note 21.
58. Warner, supra note 21, at 14.
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implement.59
This knowledge completeness assumption eliminates the
possibility of non-compliance through lack of knowledge of norms. It is the
second of the four assumptions characterizing ideal transaction conditions.60
Practice approximates knowledge completeness; one is likely to know the
norms governing the types of transactions in which one typically engages.61
A.

Detecting Norm Violations

It is quite unlikely that norm-inconsistent information processing will
escape the notice of every buyer. Awareness of norm-inconsistent information
processing can come from, inter alia, news reports, magazine articles, books,
consumer watchdog groups, negative publicity from consumer complaints, and
litigation.62 This is the third assumption characterizing ideal transaction
conditions. Call it the inconsistency-detection assumption.63
B.

Norm-Violation Detectors Versus Norm-Inconsistent Sellers

Other things being equal, buyers will not buy from sellers they regard as
norm-inconsistent.64 A norm, after all, is a regularity to which one thinks
everyone ought to conform; thus, to see a seller as norm-inconsistent is to see
that seller as treating one as one ought not to be treated. Other things being
equal, buyers will not purchase from norm-inconsistent sellers as long as

59. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATION,
290–91 (11th ed. 2004) (describing perfect knowledge as a requirement for perfect economic
competition).
60. The other three assumptions are discussed elsewhere within this article. See supra Part
I.B (discussing the norm completeness assumption); infra Part II.A (discussing the inconsistencydetection assumption); Part II.A (discussing the assumption of a sufficiently norm-competitive
market).
61. It is worth noting that if a consumer knows that practice approximates norm
completeness, then even when he or she does not know what the relevant norm is, he or she will
still have reason to think that, whatever it is, it is value-justified.
62. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure
of E-Standard Terms Backfire, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) (discussing the role of
watchdog groups).
63. Warner, supra note 21, at 14. Compare the “informed minority” assumption in the
Schwartz and Wilde argument. Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 635–39. See also Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1417–18 (1983). For criticism, see R.
Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to
Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 656 (1996) (arguing that the
assumption is empirically false). The inconsistency-detection assumption is not an empirical
claim, however, but part of the specification of a normative ideal. See infra Part IV.
64. Warner, supra note 21, at 14.
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norm-consistent sellers exist.65 The fourth assumption, introduced shortly,
ensures that such sellers exist.
C. Sellers’ Inability to Discriminate
Suppose sellers could reliably differentiate between buyers who will, and
those who will not, detect a norm-inconsistency; such sellers could then act
norm-consistently for inconsistency-detectors and violate norms for the rest.
Such discriminations are, however, extremely difficult to make in mass market
contexts.66 Imagine walking into a retail store or ordering an item online.
Nothing reliably signals the seller whether one is a norm-inconsistency
detector.67
D. The Profit-Maximizing Strategy
Assume businesses cannot identify norm-inconsistency detectors; then,
profit-motive driven sellers will conform to norms because that is the profitmaximizing strategy—provided the market is sufficiently norm-competitive.
The existence of a perfectly norm-competitive market is the fourth assumption
characterizing ideal transaction conditions. A market is perfectly competitive
with respect to a certain range of product risk-norms when—and only when—
the following two conditions hold. First, perfect competition: 1) there is a
large number of independently acting (non-colluding), perfectly informed
sellers and consumers; 2) no one of whom can unilaterally control the features
a product has; 3) sellers sell homogenous products, 4) in a market in which
competitors may costlessly enter and leave; and 5) in which consumers can
costlessly switch from one seller to another.68 Second, norm-violation
detection: there is a range of product-risk norms, and for each norm in that
range, there are enough norm-violation-detecting buyers that a seller’s gain

65. For further explanation, see Tsai et al., supra note 38.
66. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 663–65 (arguing that sellers cannot
discriminate between relevant types of buyers in mass market transactions). Cruz and Hinck
argue that, in contractual settings, sellers may be able to discriminate between different types of
buyers. Cruz & Hinck, supra note 63, at 672–75. However, only one of their arguments
explicitly addresses the ability of sellers to differentiate between buyers based on their attitudes
toward contractual terms, and that argument assumes a sales-person explicitly proposes a
contractual term, and hence assumes a context in which detection of norm-inconsistency would
be likely. Id. at 673.
67. You may, of course, reveal yourself as an inconsistency-detector if you explicitly insist
on norm-consistent treatment, or if you detect and object to norm-inconsistent behavior.
68. The condition is just one definition of a perfectly competitive market. See, e.g., JEFFERY
L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 261 (West Nutshell Ser., 4th ed. 2007).
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from norm-inconsistent behavior is smaller than the loss which results if normviolation detectors are able to buy from a substitute, norm-consistent seller.69
The first condition ensures that norm-inconsistent sellers will (other things
being equal) lose the business of every norm-violation-detecting buyer—
provided that at least one norm-consistent seller exists.70 This follows from the
fact that buyers who detect a norm-violation will not buy from that seller—
other things being equal.71 The second condition ensures that there are enough
norm-consistent sellers. When both conditions hold, the profit-maximizing
strategy is to behave norm-consistently towards all buyers.72 Rational, profitmotivated sellers will conform with that strategy.73
Since I only propose norm competitiveness as a normative goal, I will put
to one side the question of the extent to which norm-competitive markets exist
in practice.74 The issue requires a detailed antitrust analysis. Failures of normcompetitiveness may justify legal resolution. Such analysis lies outside the
scope of this Article.
III. FREE AND INFORMED CONSENT
Under ideal transaction conditions, rational, profit-driven sellers will
comply with all relevant informational norms, and those norms will implement

69. The idea of a norm-competitive market is adapted from Schwartz and Wilde’s definition
of a term-competitive market. They propose that there is lack of sufficient term-competition (in
their terminology, a “monopolistic” market with respect to terms) if “(1) the market is not price
competitive; and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal language and fine or otherwise
inconspicuous print.” Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 661. The point of (2) is to identify
those cases in which there is a high cost to consumers of searching for and understanding relevant
contractual terms; the idea is that in such cases “too few [norm] searchers may exist to generate a
nonmonopolistic term structure. Id.
70. See HARRISON, supra note 68, at 261.
71. The “other things being equal” rider merely concerns trivial exceptions that do not
matter here (for example, the buyer purchases from a norm-inconsistent seller because the seller
is a relative).
72. See HARRISON, supra note 68, at 261.
73. Id.
74. There is some evidence that norm-competitiveness does not hold. Privacy International
points out that competitive pressures lead to less informational privacy:
[W]e are witnessing an increased ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate surveillance of
customers. Some companies are leading the charge through abusive and invasive
profiling of their customers’ data. This trend is seen by even the most privacy friendly
companies as creating competitive disadvantage to those who do not follow that trend,
and in some cases [is seen as a reason] to find new and more innovative ways to become
even more surveillance-intensive.
PRIVACY INT’L, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM: PRIVACY RANKING OF INTERNET SERVICE
COMPANIES (2007), available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x347-553961. One possible explanation is that there are not enough norm-violation-detecting
buyers.
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an acceptable tradeoff between informational privacy and competing
concerns.75 It does not, however, follow that informational norms thereby
ensure an adequate degree of informational privacy. That requires that buyers
give free and informed consent to the norm-created tradeoff.76 Otherwise, they
do not have the ability “to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to [and used by] others.”77
The “informed” part of “free and informed” is not problematic—not in ideal
transaction conditions. Consent to a norm-created tradeoff is informed,
provided consumers know what the norm is and what tradeoff it implements.
The knowledge completeness assumption guarantees that consumers have the
requisite knowledge.78 It is more problematic to regard consent as free,
since—even under ideal conditions—consent appears involuntary.
Consider the wine store example.79 It appears problematic to regard
Vicky’s consent as free because, as a practical matter, she cannot avoid
consenting to the norm-imposed tradeoff. Vicky can, of course, prevent wine
stores from processing information about her by simply not doing business
with wine stores that process personal information. But, since she wishes to
buy wine, it is often difficult to avoid wine stores. Further, Vicky is not
interested in pursuing inconvenient, time-consuming searches and stratagems.
She already committed to a variety of goals—raising her children, pursuing her
career, enjoying her friends, and so on; the time she can allot to buying wine is
relatively small. Of course, she could simply not buy wine at all, but Vicky
enjoys wine and is not willing to give it up. Thus, as a practical matter, not
doing business with wine stores is not an option. This is true even when all
assumptions characterizing the ideal transaction conditions hold.
So how can Vicky’s consent be free? Constrained choices are, after all, the
“example par excellence of unfree choices.”80 When a thief holding a gun to
your head demands, “Your money or your life!,” the thief violates your
freedom by compelling your choice. You have only one meaningful option:
hand over your money. Informational-norm-governed transactions hardly rise
to the level of gun-to-the-head compulsion; nonetheless, they both do, as a
practical matter, reduce a person’s options to one. Does not the restriction of
options entail a lack of free consent?

75. Warner, supra note 21, at 18.
76. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1459 (2004).
77. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7 (emphasis added).
78. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
79. See supra Part I.
80. Warner, supra note 21, at 18.
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Margaret Radin argues strongly for a “Yes” answer.81 According to Radin,
free “consent involves a knowing understanding of what one is doing, in a
context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an
affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive
acquiescence in accepting something.”82 Grant that non-compliance with a
norm is not a practical option. Then, does not compliance violate these
conditions? It is not “actually possible for one to do otherwise,” so how does it
not follow that compliance is “merely passive acquiescence in accepting
something” and not “an affirmative action in doing something.”83
It does not follow, because a highly constrained choice can nonetheless be
a free choice. Imagine that you long to vacation in the Cayman Islands, but
you are convinced that you cannot afford to do so. You then discover an “all
inclusive” vacation package which offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single
low price. You opt for the package. When you eat the hotel food included in
the package, you have no practical option to do otherwise; you cannot afford to
eat any other way. Your choice is constrained. But, it was constrained through
your own voluntarily imposed order to freely realize your vacation goal. The
choice was one you regarded as better justified than any alternative. In the
thief example, earlier, you did not freely choose a scenario that included being
robbed by the thief.
Compare Vicky’s wine store transaction. Vicky allots only a relatively
small amount of time to purchasing wine. She wants to purchase suitable wine
within that time and return to pursuing her other goals.84 She knows the store
will process some range of personal information, and she wants an acceptable
tradeoff between her informational privacy and the various interest served by
processing the information.
The wine store norm—process personal
information only in ways appropriately related to the store’s role as a seller of
wine—offers her a ready-made tradeoff that she knows is acceptable. It
follows from knowledge completeness that Vicky knows what tradeoff the
norm entails. But, how does it follow that she knows that tradeoff is
acceptable? Vicky knows this because: 1) tradeoffs implemented by valuejustified norms are acceptable;85 2) norm completeness guarantees that the
norm is value-justified;86 and 3) knowledge completeness guarantees that

81. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1125–26 (2000) (equating a lack of options with a lack of consent).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. Cf. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 532 (1971) (attributing the rise of standard-form
contracts to the scarcity of time in modern life).
85. See supra Part I.B.
86. See supra Part I.B.
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Vicky realizes that the norm is value-justified.87 This means that Vicky need
not spend any time discovering what information the store will process about
her, nor on negotiating information processing terms should she find the
store’s intended information processing unacceptable. It bears emphasis that
this argument relies on the second premise, that norm completeness guarantees
all norms are value-justified. I will return to that point shortly.
Vicky meets two of Radin’s three requirements for free consent: “[1] a
knowing understanding of what one is doing [2] in a context in which it is
actually possible for one to do otherwise, and [3] an affirmative action in doing
something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting
something.”88 Vicky meets the first and third requirements. She has “a
knowing understanding of what [she] is doing” since she knows what the
norm-created tradeoff is and knows that it is acceptable. In addition, consent
to the norm-created tradeoff cost-effectively furthers the pursuit of important
goals, and is thus is not an “affirmative action” that fits into an overall plan
aimed at effectively realizing ends.89 The only requirement Vicky fails to meet
is that it should be “actually possible for one to do otherwise.” It is not
possible for Vicky to do otherwise—in the sense that she is committed to
purchasing wine, and any transaction in which she does so will be governed by
the relevant norm. But it is precisely a pre-packaged tradeoff Vicky wants; it
is the convenient, cost-effective way to pursue ends that is important to her.90
I conclude that consumers give free and informed consent to normimplemented tradeoffs—under ideal transaction conditions. This qualification
is essential. Ideal conditions include the norm-completeness assumption,
which ensures that all norms are value-justified.91 Recall that norms are valuejustified when, in light of the values of all (or almost all) members of the
group in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any
alternative.92 In practice, diversity in values among group members will
typically ensure that groups only approximate this definition. For simplicity,
set the problem of diversity of values aside.93 In the case of informational
norms governing consumer-merchant transactions, assume that there is
sufficient agreement on values to make the simplification permissible. The
point to emphasize here is that it is essential to the argument that the norms are
value-justified. This is a key step in the argument that consumers know that

87. See supra Part II.
88. Radin, supra note 81, at 1126.
89. Warner, supra note 21, at 20.
90. For a similar examination of these norms as applied to standard form contracts, see
Warner, supra note 21, at 20.
91. See supra Part II.B.
92. See supra text accompanying note 45.
93. Value-diversity cries out for further investigation but is outside the scope of this Article.
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norm-implemented tradeoffs are acceptable, and hence, that consumers’
consent to such tradeoffs qualifies as free.94 The link between value-justified
norms and free consent free plays a pivotal role in the next section. The
section examines four scenarios in which advances in information processing
technology have had a corrosive effect on informational norms.
IV. THE CORROSIVE EFFECT
I focus exclusively on a single corrosive effect: violations of the norm
completeness assumption. I do not mean to suggest that it is unproblematic to
assume either that the relevant markets are sufficiently norm-competitive or
that the inconsistency-detection and knowledge-completeness assumptions are
approximately true. Norm-completeness especially calls for investigation. I
focus on norm completeness because it clearly fails to hold in practice, and the
failure has important consequences. There are two ways in which norm
completeness fails to hold. The first is a lack of relevant norms altogether; the
second is a lack of value-justified norms.95 I examine one example of a lack of
norms and three examples in which the norms exist but are not value-justified.
The reason for the emphasis on the latter is that I presume that technological
advances have created novel transactions that are simply not governed by
conventional norms; whereas, on the other hand, the loss of value-justification
is less obvious and indeed has so far gone unnoticed.
A.

Lack of Norms

As a result of technological advances, businesses now process consumers’
personal information in novel ways.96 In many cases, the following two
conditions hold: 1) businesses vary considerably in the degree to which their
information processing invades informational privacy; and 2) there is no
agreement on the extent to which they ought to respect informational privacy.97
It follows that no relevant informational norm exists. Recall that a norm exists
only when there is a regularity to which one thinks one ought to conform.98
The variation in the privacy-invasiveness of information processing means that
no appropriate regularity exists, and the disagreement over how informational
privacy ought to be respected shows that there is no regularity to which we

94. See Warner, supra note 21, at 26.
95. Id. at 21.
96. See Joseph Phelps et al., Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide
Personal Information, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 27, 28 (2000).
97. Cf. Diane P. Michelfelder, The Moral Value of Informational Privacy in Cyberspace, 3
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 129, 129 (2001) (citing JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND
ISOLATION 3 (1992)) (noting inconsistent understandings of privacy by academics).
98. See supra Part I.
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think we ought to conform.99 Google’s “cloud computing”100 services are an
example.
Google’s cloud computer services include Gmail (an email service),101
Google Docs (a document editing, storage, and sharing service),102 Google
Desktop (an integrated search tool for both a computer’s local hard drive and
the Internet),103 Picasa Web Albums (a photo storage and sharing service),104
Google Calendar (a calendar sharing service), 105 and Google Buzz (a social
networking service).106 Google retains all data generated by users’ activity on
its servers.107 Users of these services identify themselves when they log in—
an action necessary to use these services—and when they add personal
information to documents.108 The result is that Google obtains and stores a
vast amount of personal information.109

99. See supra Part I.
100. In cloud computing, applications and data are stored on servers remotely accessed by
web browsers. See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT’L
INST. OF STANDARDS (Oct. 7, 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/index.
html.
101. GMAIL, http://mail.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
102. GOOGLE DOCS, http://www.docs.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
103. GOOGLE DESKTOP, http://www.desktop.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
104. PICASA WEB ALBUMS, http://www.picasaweb.google.com (last visted Apr. 10, 2011).
105. GOOGLE CALENDAR, http://calendar.google.com (last visted Apr. 10, 2011).
106. GOOGLE BUZZ, http://www.google.com/buzz (last visted Apr. 10, 2011).
107. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE PRIVACY CTR., http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacypolicy.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
108. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation, and For Other Relief at
7, In re Google, Inc. & Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf.
109. Here is a brief summary of the information Google processed at the time the Complaint
was filed in In re Google. Each privacy policy allowed Google to use the information to maintain
and improve Google services. Depending on how “maintain and improve” is interpreted, the
provision could have granted Google a broad license to use the information as it wishes. On
October 3, 2010, however, Google amended their general privacy policy to extend to all products,
services, and websites including Gmail, Google Docs, Google Desktop, Picasa Web Albums,
Google Calendar, and Google Buzz. Privacy Policy, supra note 107. For more information, see
Zimmer, supra note 33, at 115–18 (summarizing Google’s information processing practices).
Gmail: “Google records information such as account activity (including storage usage,
number of log-ins), data displayed or clicked on (including UI elements, ads, links), and other log
information (including browser type, IP-address, date and time of access, cookie ID, and referrer
URL).” GMAIL PRIVACY NOTICE, Feb. 9, 2010, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html
(on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
Google Docs: “Google records information such as account activity (e.g., storage usage,
number of log-ins, actions taken), data displayed or clicked on (e.g., UI elements, links), and
other log information (e.g., browser type, IP address, date and time of access, cookie ID, referrer
URL). Content. Google Docs stores, processes and maintains your files (as well as previous
versions of your files), sharing lists, and other data related to your account in order to provide the
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No norm defines what a cloud computing service provider may do with the
information it processes. To begin with, there is no regularity; the service
providers vary significantly in the extent to which their information processing
invades informational privacy.110 Further, as the sharp controversy over cloud
computing privacy shows, there is no agreement as to what the regularity ought
to be.111 Similar remarks could be made about a number of other technology-

service to you.” GOOGLE DOCS PRIVACY POLICY, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.google.com/google
-d-s/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
Google Desktop: “The Google Desktop application indexes and stores versions of your
files and other computer activity, such as email, chats, and web history. These versions may also
be mixed with your Web search results to produce results pages for you that integrate relevant
content from your computer and information from the Web. Your computer’s content is not sent
to Google without your explicit permission. Your copy of Google Desktop includes a unique
application number. This number and information about your installation (e.g., operating system
type, version number) will be sent to Google when you first install and use it and when Google
Desktop automatically checks for updates.” GOOGLE DESKTOP PRIVACY POLICY, Nov. 2008,
http://desktop.google.com/privacypolicy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
Picasa Web Albums: “Google’s servers automatically record certain information . . . such
as account activity (including storage usage and number of log-ins), data displayed or clicked on
(including UI links); and other log information (including browser type, IP-address, date and time
of access, cookie ID, and referrer URL).” PICASA PRIVACY NOTICE, Dec. 02, 2008,
http://picasa.google.com/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
Google Calendar: “Usage statistics. We may record information about your usage of
Google Calendar, such as when and for how long you use the service, the frequency and size of
data transfers, and the number of events and calendars you create. Information displayed or
clicked on in your Google Calendar account (including UI elements, ads, links, and other
information) is also recorded for the purposes described below. Every ninety days, if not more
frequently, we permanently delete usage statistics associated with your use of Google Calendar.
We retain this information beyond 90 days in aggregate form only.” GOOGLE CALENDAR
PRIVACY NOTICE, Oct. 14, 2010, http://www.google.com/intl/en/googlecalendar/privacy_policy.
html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
Google Buzz: “When you use Google Buzz, we may record information about your use of
the product, such as the posts you like or comment on and the other users with whom you
communicate . . . . Your activity on “connected sites” (such as Picasa Web Albums or Twitter)
may be shared in Google Buzz.” GOOGLE BUZZ PRIVACY POLICY, May 19, 2010,
http://www.google.com/buzz/help/intl/en/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.).
110. See ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 6 (2009), available at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/cloudprivacy.html.
111. Id. at 4. See also Brian Hayes, Cloud Computing, COMM. OF THE ASSOC. OF
COMPUTING MACHINERY (ACM), July 2008, at 9, 11 (noting that the cloud-computing “issues of
privacy and confidentiality are equally perplexing”). In December 2009, the FTC filed a
comment with the Federal Communications Commission; the comment noted that the “FTC staff
presently is examining “cloud computing” and its privacy and data security implications for
consumers.” See Letter from David C. Vladeck, Office of the Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer
Prot., FTC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.
gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020352132.
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fostered activities, including those utilizing cookies,112 flash cookies,113 deep
packet inspection,114 and radio frequency identification tags.115 By using these
devices, consumers provide personal information. But, without relevant
informational norms in place, consumers cannot effectively consent to the
dissemination of their information to businesses. To lack free and informed
consent is to lack informational privacy;116 but, without relevant informational
norms in place, they lack an effective means to give or withhold free and
informed consent to the ways in which the businesses will process the
information, and to lack free and informed consent is to lack informational
privacy.
As important as this conclusion is, to stop the analysis here would be to
overlook another important way in which we lack norms. In an important
range of cases, relevant informational norms exist but, as a consequence of
increased effectiveness in processing information, they are not valuejustified.117 The result is a lack of value-justified norms. The consequences
are the same: consumers cannot rely on norms to ensure free and informed

112. A cookie is a small text file stored on a computer by a web browser when one visits a
web site. See HAL ABELSON ET AL., BLOWN TO BITS: YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS
AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 40 (4th prtg. 2010). The Internet Engineering Task Force has
promulgated an international standard for the use of cookies. Memorandum from David M.
Kristol & Lou Montulli, Internet Eng’g Task Force on HTTP State Management Mechanism
(Feb. 2007), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2109.txt. Uses of cookies that depart from
this standard can raise privacy concerns. See, e.g., Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy,
Cookiecentral.com, http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
113. Flash cookies are essentially cookies that are stored in a different location. See What Are
Local Shared Objects?, ADOBE SYS. INC., http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/art
icles/lso/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). Unlike traditional cookies, many users are unaware of their
existence and standard spyware removal tools do not delete them; this raises a number of privacy
issues. See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 1 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished
Summer Undergraduate Program in Engineering Research at Berkley (SUPERB) study,
University of California, Berkley), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1446862.
114. Deep packet inspection is a technology that allows an ISP to view the content that its
subscribers send over the Internet. See Ohm, supra note 2, at 1468. It has a number of
reasonable uses but raises serous privacy concerns.
115. An RFID tag is a silicon chip that emits a radio signal that identifies the tagged item.
See ABELSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 25. RFID tags have number of important uses (for
example, they have been implanted in cattle in order to track them). See id. They do raise a
number of privacy concerns, however. See RULE, supra note 3, at 182–83 (describing the use of
RFID tags to track school children). See also generally KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ
MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS: HOW MAJOR CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TRACK YOUR
EVERY MOVE WITH RFID (2005).
116. One might object that a consent requirement could ensure free and informed consent in
the absence of norms. I argue against this claim. See infra Part V.
117. See supra Part I.A.2.
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consent to norm-implemented tradeoffs and, hence, cannot rely on such norms
to ensure an adequate degree of informational privacy.
An analogy illustrates the connection between increased effectiveness in
processing information and the loss of value-justification. Imagine two
elementary school friends who adhere to the norm, “throw as hard as you can,”
when they play catch. One of them moves away and returns later as a
teenager. When the reunited friends again play catch, one of them injures the
other by throwing the ball with great force. When the injured friend
complains, the thrower says that she was simply following the norm to throw
as hard as possible. Both agree that, in light of their current physical abilities
and values, the norm is no longer value-justified; they no longer think that
“throw as hard as you can” is at least as well justified as any other alternative
(e.g., “throw half as hard as you can”).
Technological advances have made businesses able to “throw harder.”
Technology makes businesses far more effective in determining whether an
individual meets whatever requirements businesses wish to impose.118 The
consequence is the same as in the friends-playing-catch example: the relevant
norms are no longer value-justified. There is, however, one crucial difference.
The friends would abandon their old norm; in case of business information
processing, however, the norms are retained. Thus, like the hockey players,
consumers find themselves trapped in conformity to norms that are not valuejustified.119 I offer three examples of businesses that use norms which are not
value-justified: the role of retailers in collecting personal information for the
purposes of direct marketing; information aggregation services; and the
information processing practices of the health insurance industry.
B.

Direct Marketing: Retailers as Information Brokers

Direct marketing sorts buyers into groups according to their willingness to
purchase certain products and services for the purpose of targeting
advertising.120 Targeted advertising matches advertising content to recipients
in ways that maximize the likelihood that recipients will purchase the marketed
materials.121 Defining direct marketing categories requires processing a great
deal of personal information about consumers. Retailers routinely collect
118. Cf. Finance, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT.: BUS. CTR., http://business.ftc.gov/selectedindustries/finance (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (describing use of technology by banks to avoid
fraudulent consumers).
119. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
120. Carol Scovotti & Lisa Spiller, Abstract, Revisiting the Conceptual Definition of Direct
Marketing: Perspectives from Scholars and Practitioners, at *3 (2005), available at
http://www.the-dma.org/dmef/proceedings05/Revisitingthe-Spiller.pdf (“Direct marketing is a
database-driven process of directly communicating with targeted customers or prospects using
any medium to obtain a measurable response or transaction via one or multiple channels.”).
121. Solove, supra note 76, at 1404.
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sufficient personal data such that they can also function as information
brokers.122 Retailers acting as information brokers play a critical role in
feeding direct marketing the personal information it needs.123 Credit card
companies are a convenient example. Dywer v. American Express Co.124
illustrates their information brokerage practices:
[American Express] categorize[s] and rank[s] [its] cardholders into six tiers
based on spending habits and then rent[s] this information to participating
merchants as part of a targeted joint-marketing and sales program. For
example, a cardholder may be characterized as “Rodeo Drive Chic” or “Value
Oriented.” In order to characterize its cardholders, [American Express]
analyze[s] where they shop and how much they spend, and also consider
behavioral characteristics and spending histories. . . . The merchants using the
[] service can also target shoppers in categories such as mail-order apparel
buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shoppers, luxury lodgers,
card members with children, skiers, frequent business travelers, resort users,
125
Asian/European travelers, luxury European car owners, or recent movers.

I make two contentions: first, that allowing retailers to function as information
brokers for the purposes of direct marketing is a norm; and second, that the
norm is not value-justified. An essential preliminary to arguing for this claim
is a fuller description of direct marketing.
1.

Direct Marketing

The development of direct marketing provides an excellent example of
how advances in information processing technology can enable businesses to
“throw harder”—to more effectively determine a specific individual’s
willingness to purchase. Direct marketing was not particularly effective and,
hence, not widely used until the 1970s.126 Prior to that time, direct marketers
did a poor job of differentiating consumers according to their willingness to
122. Id. at 1408 (“An increasing number of companies with databases—magazines, credit
card companies, stores, mail order catalog firms, and even telephone companies—are realizing
that their databases are becoming one of their most valuable assets and are beginning to sell their
data.”). An information broker collects, analyzes, and distributes information to clients. ANGIE
A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22087, INFORMATION BROKERS: FEDERAL AND
STATE LAWS 2 n.2 (2005) (citations omitted).
123. Daniel Solove notes:
The effectiveness of targeted marketing depends upon data . . . . Billions of bytes are
released each second as we click, charge, and call. A treasure trove of information
already lay untapped within existing databases, retail records, mailing lists, and
government records. All that marketers had to do was plunder it as efficiently as possible.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 19 (2004).
124. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
125. Id. at 1353.
126. Solove, supra note 76, at 1405–06.
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buy various products and services.127 This changed in the 1970s, when the
government began selling census data on magnetic tapes.128 Marketing
companies used the data to construct databases divided according to, inter alia,
“age, income level, race, ethnicity, gender, and geographical location.”129 In
the 1980s, marketers supplemented this data with “psychographic” information
such as opinions, lifestyles, likes and dislikes, and hobbies.130 The rich data
set, along with advances in database technology and information processing,
make direct marketing remarkably effective.131
Such is the sophistication of American direct marketing that . . . [o]ne can
reasonably expect to purchase a listing of five thousand women who are both
public employees and wear sexy underwear; or business owners who espouse
far-right political causes; or registered Republicans who are purchasers of
pornography—or, for that matter, of pornography with S-M themes. . . . [You
can purchase the] guest list information from a hotel frequented by lesbians . . .
[and lists of] women who buy wigs; callers to a romance telephone service;
impotent middle-aged men; gamblers; buyers of hair removal products; male
buyers of fashion underwear; believers in the feminist political movement,
132
anti-gay movement, and prayer in the public schools movement.

Direct-mail marketing “yields $10 in sales for every $1 in costs—a ratio
double that for a television advertisement”133 and accounts for just over half of
all advertising expenditures.134
The effectiveness of direct marketing is a boon to businesses.135
Businesses are not, however, the only beneficiaries of direct marketing.
127. See id. at 1405 (listing only a 2% success rate for direct marketing).
128. Id. at 1406.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Solove, supra note 76, at 1407.
132. RULE, supra note 3, at 104.
133. Solove, supra note 76, at 1407.
134. Direct Marketing Advertising Expenditures Account for 53% of Total Advertising
Expenditures, DMA’s ‘Power of Direct Marketing’ Report Unveils, DIRECT MKTG. ASS’N (Oct.
13, 2008), http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease?article=1228.
135. It is especially important in the case of new products or services:
Once a business has developed a new product or service, it must inform potential
customers. The cost of alerting consumers about a new product or opportunity can be a
major obstacle to the launch of new businesses and prevent innovative products from ever
reaching the marketplace. . . . “Target marketing” allows a business to send an offer to a
customer specifically identified as likely to be interested. In the absence of information
that indicates which consumers are likely customers, businesses must choose between
marketing randomly, contacting everyone in an entire geographic community, or relying
solely on mass media advertising to reach potential customers.
Fred H. Cate & Michael E. Staten, The Value of Information Sharing (Nat’l Retail Fed’n
Protecting Privacy in the New Millennium Ser., July 28, 2000), available at http://www.bbb
online.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/whitepapers/valueofinfosharing.pdf.
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Consumers benefit from more efficient businesses, access to new products and
services, and from receiving information relevant to their needs and
interests.136 The cost is a loss of informational privacy.137 The more one loses
the ability to control how others process one’s personal information, the more
one loses informational privacy.138 The information processing activities that
support direct marketing involve a significant loss of control; indeed, direct
marketing is a prime example of “mass surveillance”—the use of
“[s]ystematically harvested personal information . . . to determine what
treatment to mete out to each individual.”139 This “systematic harvesting” is
facilitated by the fact that, as noted earlier, “it has become increasingly rare to
deal with any . . . private-sector organization without generating and relying
upon a database of personal information.”140
2.

The “Retailers as Information Brokers” Norm

Despite the loss of control, the norm is that retailers may act as information
brokers for direct marketing purposes.141 The relevant regularity clearly
obtains: retailers do act as information brokers. The regularity is, moreover,
sanction-supported. Interacting with businesses typically involves “generating
and relying upon a database of personal information,”142 and the sanction for
refusing to generate or rely on such information is typically that one cannot
interact with the business or must do so on less favorable terms.143 Refusal to
issue a credit card is, for example, a possible sanction for not agreeing to credit
card companies’ information brokerage activities, and foregoing discounts and
other advantages is the cost for refusing to use retailers’ discount cards.144 In
light of the sanctions, most think they ought to conform to the norm. One can
forgo having a particular credit card or using a particular discount card, but
wholesale avoidance of generating and relying on databases of personal
information would mean a wholesale avoidance of a wide range of commercial

136. Privacy, Current Legislation and DMA Action, DIRECT MKTG. ASS’N, http://www.thedma.org/cgi/dispissue?article=129 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
137. MILLS, supra note 7, at 271.
138. Id.
139. See RULE, supra note 3, at 14 (defining mass surveillance).
140. Rule, supra note 4, at 183.
141. See id. at 196 (describing how information is shifted from one sphere to another).
142. Id. at 183.
143. See, e.g., MasterCard Worldwide-Global Privacy Policy, MASTERCARD (June 1, 2010),
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/general/global-privacy-notice.html (predicating access
to some services on consent to information dispersal).
144. Id.
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interactions,145 and for most, that sanction is unacceptable. As Hal Abelson,
Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis note:
[W]e give up data about ourselves because we don’t have the time, patience, or
single-mindedness about privacy that would be required to live our daily lives
in another way. In the U.S., the number of credit, debit, and bank cards is in
the billions. Every time one is used, an electronic handshake records a few bits
of information about who is using it, when, where, and for what. It is now
virtually unheard of for people to make large purchases of ordinary consumer
goods with cash. Personal checks are going the way of cassette tape drives,
rendered irrelevant by newer technologies. Even if you could pay cash for
everything you buy, the tax authorities would have you in their databases
146
anyway.

Consumers might choose to bear the sanctions temporarily in a general
consumer revolt; however, unilateral non-conformance by any one consumer
carries sanctions that make non-conformity a choice each consumer avoids.
Most, therefore, decide that on prudential grounds they ought to conform (or
would after adequate reflection, so decide).147
3.

The Norm is Not Value-Justified

The norm is nonetheless not value-justified. Consumers conform to the
“retailers as information brokers” norm in order to avoid the sanctions of nonconformity, but—I contend—they do not regard the “retailers as information
brokers” norm as at least as well-justified as any alternative. Consumers
instead regard an alternative in which they have more control over their
personal information as better justified.
This is the most plausible
interpretation of over twenty years of studies and surveys about consumer
attitudes toward privacy.148 A typical study found that 89% of consumers had
either a “high concern” (53.7%) or a “medium concern” (35.5%) about
“general privacy.”149 Table 1 reproduces the results of that study.
145. Posner, supra note 6, at 248 (“[A] person would have to be a hermit to be able to
function in our society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal information to a
vast array of public and private demanders.”).
146. ABELSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 41–42. Indeed, it is nearly impossible in practice to
avoid all data collection. “Regardless of how cautious and informationally conservative a
consumer is, they do not have the ability to live a modern life and avoid being systemically
profiled. Consumer profiling is currently unavoidable by the majority of consumers.” Letter
from Pam Dixon, Exec. Dir., World Policy Forum, to Fed. Trade Comm. 10 (Nov. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Comments_FTC_110609fs.pdf.
147. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
148. There is an excellent collection of relevant studies in an online database maintained by
Alessandro Acquisti. See Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Privacy, http://www.heinz.
cmu.edu/~acquisti/economics-privacy.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
149. Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision
Making, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, 28 tbl.1.
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Table 1150

High
Concern
Medium
Concern
Low
Concern

General
privacy
concern
(%)

Data
about
offline
identity
(%)

Data
about
online
identity
(%)

Data
about
personal
profile
(%)

Data about
professional
profile
(%)

Data about
sexual and
political
identity
(%)

53.7

39.6

25.2

0.9

11.9

12.1

35.5

48.3

41.2

16.8

50.8

25.8

10.7

12.1

33.6

82.3

37.3

62.1

Of course, finding that consumers are “concerned” does not mean that they
are concerned about the loss of control over their private information, but why
else would consumers be concerned? The concern is surely that others will do
something unacceptable with the information.151 It would be strange if this
were not true. In general, control is an important consideration in determining
whether to enter into or continue a relationship.152 One may, for example,
refuse to associate with someone because he or she is too controlling. In
commercial relationships, conformity to the “retailers as information brokers”
norm entails a significant loss of control over personal information; direct
marketing is, as noted earlier, an example par excellence of mass surveillance.
Why would one not be seriously concerned about such a loss of control? As
the privacy advocates remind us, a significant degree of control is essential to
“intimacy, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, autonomy,
freedom,
self-development,
creativity,
independence,
imagination,
counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of thought, democracy, reputation, and
psychological well-being.”153 Anyone—and that is virtually everyone—who
values at least some of the items in this list values informational privacy and is,
therefore, concerned with retaining an appropriate degree of control over
personal information.
The conclusion would seem unavoidable that the “retailers as information
brokers” norm is not value-justified. It is value-justified only if, in light of
consumers’ values, it is at least as well justified as any alternative.154 But, it
seems clear that consumers regard as better justified alternatives that allow

150. Id.
151. Alessandro Acquisti seems to take it for granted that this is the explanation. See
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and Security of Personal Information: Economic Incentives and
Technological Solutions, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 179, 182 (L. Jean Camp &
Stephen Lewis eds., Kluwer Int’l Ser. on Advances in Info. Sec., 2004).
152. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 27.
153. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98.
154. See Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9.
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them to retain more control over their personal information.155 There is,
however, a seemingly serious objection: the studies referred to above actually
contain conflicting results. Although a large number of studies show
consumers are concerned about losing control over personal information, there
is evidence that individuals value privacy less than they may claim; in fact,
“many are willing to trade off personal information for small rewards.”156 The
“retailers as information brokers” norm would seem to be a case in point. If
consumers find the loss of control objectionable, why do they conform when
the cost of non-conformity is mere inconvenience and loss of some minor
advantages such as discounts?
This point does not disconfirm the claim that the norm is not valuejustified; it confirms it. The point is precisely what one should expect if
consumers are trapped in conformity to a norm that is not value-justified. The
hockey players’ “no helmet” norm illustrates the point.157 The hockey players
did not wear helmets even though their values made “all players wear helmets”
a far better-justified alternative. The sanctions were sufficient to ensure
players did not unilaterally decide to violate the norm. Similarly, consumers
conform to the “retailers as information brokers” norm even though their
values make “consumers have more control” a much better-justified
alternative. The sanctions are sufficient to discourage unilateral nonconformity.158 Like the no-helmet-norm hockey players, consumers are
trapped in conformity to a norm that is not value-justified.
As noted earlier, conformity to informational norms counts as free consent
to norm-implemented tradeoffs only if the norms are value-justified.159
Sanction-compelled conformity to norms that are not value-justified is

155. For a sketch of a system that would provide more control, see Daniel J. Weitzner et al.,
Information Accountability, 51 COMM. OF THE ACM, June 2008, at 82, 86. For discussion and
criticism, see Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Developing Foundations for Accountability
Systems: Informational Norms and Context-Sensitive Judgments, in 2010 ANNUAL COMPUTER
SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, at 21, available at http://www.acsac.org/2010/work
shop/p21-sloan.pdf.
156. Jens Grossklags & Alessandro Acquisti, When 25 Cents Is Too Much: An Experiment on
Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal Information, available at http://weis
2007.econinfosec.org/papers/66.pdf. See also Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 26, 31
(finding consumers to have misconceptions regarding loss of privacy); Beales & Muris, supra
note 14, at 114 (“Judging by behavior in the marketplace, most consumers have better things to
do with their time than read privacy notices.”); Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An Empirical
Approach to Understanding Privacy Valuation 1–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07075, 2007), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-075.pdf (noting that consumers
trade privacy for economic gain and proposing a model of the tradeoff).
157. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
158. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 31 (discussing how cost may discourage a
consumer from adopting a privacy technology).
159. See supra Part I.A.2.
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compelled conformity to an alternative inconsistent with one’s values and
should not count as free consent to the norm-implemented tradeoff. It follows
that consumers do not give free and informed consent to the tradeoff
implemented by the norm, and hence, they do not have an adequate degree of
informational privacy.
C. Information Aggregators
Information aggregators are businesses that collect and resell personal
information.160 ChoicePoint, one of the largest, obtains 40,000 new records
daily for its ever-growing database of more than 19 billion records.161
ChoicePoint’s clients include government agencies, insurance companies,
employers doing background checks, direct marketers, and potentially anyone
with an interest in obtaining information about others.162 I contend that it is a
norm that information aggregators may process and resell any type of
information (within legal limits) and that the norm is not value-justified.
The relevant regularity clearly exists: information aggregators do process
and resell a wide variety information. The sanction for non-conformity is the
same as in the case of the “retailers as information brokers” norm: wholesale
avoidance of generating and relying on databases of personal information
would mean a wholesale avoidance of a wide range of commercial
interactions.163 For most consumers, the considerable inconvenience and loss
of various advantages and privileges is unacceptable.164 Most, therefore,
decide on prudential grounds that they ought to conform.165 The norm is
nonetheless not value-justified. The argument is again the same as in the case
of the “retailers as information brokers” norm. Consumers value privacy in
ways that lead them to better justify an alternative in which they have greater
The lack of valuecontrol over information processing practices.166
justification means that consumers do not give free and informed consent to

160. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 109–10.
161. Duane D. Stanford, All our Lives are on File for Sale, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 21,
2004, at A1.
162. For information about ChoicePoint, see ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 2
(paperback ed. 2006).
163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
164. ChoicePoint collects information from two sources: public records and private sources,
and one can attempt to foil ChoicePoint’s processing by not disclosing information to the latter,
or by providing misrepresentations in what one does disclose. See O’HARROW, supra note 162,
at 2. Public records may arise from mandatory disclosure (recording property transactions, for
example), or voluntary disclosures under penalty of perjury (as in court proceedings); failure to
disclose and misrepresentation risk legal and non-legal sanctions.
165. See id. at 7 (discussing the American desire to trade freedom for security, in the wake of
the United States Patriot Act).
166. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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the tradeoff implemented by the norm, and hence, they do not have an
adequate degree of informational privacy.
The exact parallels with the “retailers as information brokers” norm do not
deprive the “information aggregator” norm of interest. On the contrary, one of
the hallmarks of contemporary personal-information processing is the flow of
information from various businesses and other sources to information
aggregators.167 Unlike collecting information exclusively for purposes of direct
marketing, the practices of information aggregators ensure that information
collected on one occasion for one purpose is retained, analyzed, and distributed
for a variety of purposes to anyone who may lawfully obtain the
information.168 One critical concern is that bits and pieces of personal
information, innocuous when taken separately, can be aggregated into a
permanently available and highly revealing profile.169 Privacy advocates paint
disturbing pictures of the possible consequences. Daniel Solove, for example,
contends:
We’re heading toward a world where an extensive trail of information
fragments about us will be forever preserved on the Internet, displayed
instantly in a Google search. We will be forced to live with a detailed record
beginning with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go,
searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world. This data can often be
of dubious reliability; it can be false and defamatory; or it can be true but
deeply humiliating or discrediting. We may find it increasingly difficult to
have a fresh start, a second chance, or a clean slate. We might find it harder to
engage in self-exploration if every false step and foolish act is chronicled
forever in a permanent record. This record will affect our ability to define our
170
identities, to obtain jobs, to participate in public life, and more.

Solove is merely describing possibilities, but these possibilities highlight a
fact: data aggregation entails a significant lost control over our personal
information.171 The connection possibilities and fact is hardly unique to
personal information. The possibility of having to make an emergency stop,

167. O’HARROW, supra note 162, at 2.
168. Id.
169. Solove, supra note 76, at 1452.
170. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 17 (2007).
171. Privacy advocates are often criticized for merely describing possibilities. The
possibilities may be illustrated by actual cases, but the essential point is that the same thing might
happen to us. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1154 (2004) (“[T]he typical privacy article rests its case precisely
on an appeal to its reader’s intuitions and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations.”). The
criticism is certainly just. James Rule laments that privacy advocates too often rely on “gut
reactions.” RULE, supra note 3, at 183. However, merely to make this criticism misses one
underlying point of the describing the possibilities: they demonstrate the fact of loss of control.
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for example, highlights the fact that driving a car at 80 miles per hour involves
a significantly greater chance for loss of control when compared to driving at
50 miles per hour. Similarly, the degree and significance of our loss of control
over our personal information is illustrated by the possible outcomes to which
it exposes us.
As important as the loss of control is, it is not the only reason one should
be concerned about a loss of informational privacy. As the next example
illustrates, technologically-enhanced information process can lead to
objectionable outcomes that do not consist just in a loss of control.
D. The Health Insurance Industry
Health insurers make money by collecting more in premiums than they pay
out in compensation; to do so, they must correlate premiums with risks.172
This requires processing personal information about morbidity and mortality,
in order to identify high risk individuals.173 They can then control the ratio of
compensation to premiums by refusing to insure high-risk applicants,
discontinuing insuring current high-risk customers, or charging high-risk
applicants and customers higher premiums.174 Keeping insurance companies
in business benefits both the companies and the consumers who pay for their
health care through insurance.175 One cost is a loss of informational privacy.
Consumers lose control over personal information pertaining to mortality and
morbidity. I contend that it is a norm that health insurance companies may
process any legally obtained personal information relevant to determining risks
of morbidity and mortality and that the norm is not value-justified.
Insurance companies do routinely process such health information, and this
regularity is sanction-supported.176 To illustrate the sanctions, suppose that
after his wife dies, Jones’ doctor prescribes Prozac for Jones’ temporary
depression. Jones’ insurance pays both for the office visit and for the Prozac.
Five years later, Jones leaves his employment—and his employer-provided
health insurance—to open his own business. Fearing that the diagnosis of
depression and the prescription of Prozac could lead to the denial of insurance
or higher premiums,177 he omits noting the depression diagnosis and
corresponding prescription on his application for insurance. If the insurance

172. Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2515 (2002).
173. See id.
174. Manns, supra note 172, at 2515.
175. In addition, it has the benefits typically associated with allowing a business to collect
information. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
176. See Lawrence Gostin, Health Care Information and the Protection of Personal Privacy:
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 127 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 683, 685 (1997).
177. See How a History of mental Illness Affects Your Life Insurance Rates, INSURE.COM,
http://www.insure.com/articles/lifeinsurance/mental-illness.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010).
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company discovers the omission, sanctions include the denial of coverage and
liability for fraud.178
It is highly likely that the company will discover the omission. The health
insurance industry’s use of information aggregation services makes it quite
difficult to conceal medical history.179 The industry uses both general
information aggregators like ChoicePoint and specialized ones like the Medical
Information Bureau (MIB).180 MIB is a trade association whose insurance
company members share information in the form of MIB records.181 MIB
claims that the “MIB Checking Service is the fastest, most effective way to
prevent omissions and material misrepresentations on insurance applications.
It’s the only method available during underwriting to help you immediately
confirm whether the information applicants provide is accurate and
complete.”182 Such information aggregators allow health insurance companies
to effectively detect and sanction those who fail to conform to the regularity of
allowing the companies to process personal information concerning morbidity
and mortality.
In light of the sanctions, most consumers think they ought to conform.
One may occasionally succeed in concealing information about morbidity and
mortality, but on the whole, health insurance companies are likely to acquire
such information despite attempts at concealment, and the likely sanction—

178. See, e.g., ANTHEM, MISSOURI: INDIVIDUAL ENROLLMENT APPLICATION 8 (2011),
available at http://docs.anthem.com/wellpoint/docs/viewDocument?mcItemNbr=AMO-103C-ER.
Courts uphold the right to collect the information, either because the information is publicly
available or because consumers have contractually agreed to the companies’ data collection
activities.
179. Services specifically targeting the health insurance industry include MIB Group, Inc.,
http://www.mib.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011), which collects, uses, and distributes information
from health insurance applications, and Milliman IntelliScript, MILLIMAN, http://www.mill
iman.com/expertise/healthcare/products-tools/intelliscript (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). Insurers
can use Milliman IntelliScript to gather prescription information in real time and then review an
easy-to-read online report. Id.
180. See RENEE MARLIN-BENNETT, KNOWLEDGE POWER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
INFORMATION, AND PRIVACY 194 (2004) (noting that MIB has existed since 1902 but that
technology has greatly increased its power to process information).
181. Actuarial and Statistical Research Group, MIB GROUP, INC., http://www.mib
solutions.com/risk_analytics (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). MIB records consist of codes indicating
medical conditions which affect morbidity or mortality. JON SHREVE, MILLIMAN PROTECTIVE
VALUE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF THE MIB CHECKING SERVICE ON HEALTH INSURANCE
UNDERWRITING (2006), available at http://www.mibsolutions.com/pdf/20060310 20MILLIMAN
20HEALTH 20PV 20SUMMARY.pdf.
182. MIB Checking Service-Issue with Confidence, MIB GROUP, INC, http://www.mib
solutions.com/health (last visited Apr. 1l, 2011).
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denial of coverage183—is a disaster in a market economy in which one pays for
health care through health insurance. The loss of coverage is thus a risk most
think they should avoid. Hence, on the whole, the only reasonable option is to
conform to the norm by not attempting to conceal information about morbidity
and mortality.184
The norm is, however, not value-justified. As in the previous two
examples, one reason the norm is not value-justified is that consumers regard
an alternative in which they have more control over their personal information
as better justified. In this case, however, there is an additional reason the norm
is not value-justified: consumers also regard as better justified an alternative
that differently distributes health care. To see why, consider that the
distribution of health care in the United States is determined, in large part, by
the distribution of private health insurance.185 The vast majority of those who
have carefully reflected on the problem without bias or prejudice have
concluded that the distribution is seriously flawed; many who ought to have
health care go without.186 Thus, if we—people in general—were to reflect
adequately on the issue, it is highly likely we would regard an alternative
distribution as better justified. The conclusion remains the same as before:
consumers do not give free and informed consent to the tradeoff implemented
by the norm, and hence, they do not have an adequate degree of informational
privacy.
E.

Further Examples

The foregoing examples are not isolated instances. One could make the
similar claims about lack of value-justification in a number of cases, including:
employer use of information in hiring and retention decisions,187 the extension
183. See, e.g., ANTHEM, supra note 178, at 8 (“If we issue coverage to you and then discover
an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material
fact, we may rescind your coverage, even after it has been issued.”).
184. One might object that this is not true of someone who, for example, thinks it is always
morally wrong to lie (even to an insurance company) and who would thus not attempt to conceal
information through deceit. That person would conform because he or she thinks lying is wrong.
But this just shows that the person has two reasons to conform: lying is always wrong; and, there
is no other reasonable option.
185. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More
Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005).
186. See ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2005
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/
uninsured-cps (displaying demographics of the uninsured).
187. Employer use of information aggregators allows employers to acquire a wide range of
personal information including information applicants or employees attempt to conceal. The
sanction for concealment is typically denial of employment and possible legal liability; such
sanctions are so severe that, for most, the only reasonable option is not to attempt to conceal
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of credit,188 news reporting,189 and the practice of price discrimination.190 Let
us continue, however, to focus on the direct marketing, information aggregator,
and health insurance examples. In each case, we—like the pre-1979 hockey
players191—are trapped in conformity to a norm inconsistent with our values. I
contend that individuals should respond by seeking to create relevant valuejustified norms. The task is by no means easy. To see why, consider one
critical difference between the examples and the hockey players. It was easy
for the hockey players to specify a NHL-mandated helmet requirement as an
alternative to the no-helmet norm.192 It is far more difficult to specify
alternatives to the norms in the previous examples. People want more control
and a better distribution of health care, but describing how best to achieve that
requires explaining how to balance a variety of competing concerns, and it is
by no means clear how to strike the balance. But doesn’t this overlook an
obvious and much simpler solution: require consent?

information they employer may regard as relevant. Privacy advocates warn that information
aggregators have given employers such an extensive power to peer into the lives of applicants and
employees that:
[O]ur society will see a growing number of individuals who are disenfranchised for life.
Large numbers will not be able to find employment because of negative information . . .
—whether true or not—from years gone by. Or they will be relegated to lower-paying
jobs in the service industries, unable to bring their true abilities into the employment
marketplace. We [www.privacyrights.org] have been contacted by many such individuals
in our ten-year history.
Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVATE RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 19, 2002), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/onlinepubrecs.htm.
188. James Rule discusses the greatly enhanced ability of creditors to determine whether their
criteria of credit worthiness are fulfilled. See RULE, supra note 3, at 102; Charles Duhigg, What
Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 17, 2009, at 40.
189. Technology has both expanded reporters access to information and their ability to report
it through non-traditional means such as blogs. The greatly increased depth to which reporters
can penetrate into people’s lives is highly controversial. See MILLS, supra note 7, at 287.
190. Price discrimination is “[t]he practice of offering identical or similar goods to different
buyers at different prices when the costs of producing the goods are the same.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1227 (8th ed. 2004). It is a long-established practice that has greatly increased in
frequency as the result of technological advances. See Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics,
and Price Discrimination on the Internet, in ICEC2003: FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 355–66 (N. Sadeh ed., 2003), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 151, at 187. Price discrimination requires sorting buyers
into groups according to their willingness to pay, and that requires a significant amount of
information. Consequently, sellers structure their interactions so they can collect and use the
necessary information. Id. at 355. Price discrimination and its data collection practices are
controversial. See generally Douglas M. Kochelek, Note, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 515 (2009).
191. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1084

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1047

V. A CONSENT REQUIREMENT IS NOT A SOLUTION
A consent requirement will not ensure an adequate degree of informational
privacy. First, individuals simply do not invest the time, attention, and effort
needed to read the privacy notices.193 Second, even if they did, it would be
practically impossible to devote enough time to obtain and understand all the
relevant information.194 Third, even if they could obtain and understand all the
relevant information, they would, in a wide range of cases, make an
undesirable tradeoff between informational privacy and competing concerns.195
I consider each objection in turn.
A.

Consumers Do Not Read Privacy Notices

It is commonplace to note that consumers typically do not take the time to
read privacy provisions in contracts or privacy polices.196 “Judging by
behavior in the marketplace, most consumers have better things to do with
their time than read privacy notices. . . . [P]rocessing privacy notices is a cost
that most consumers apparently do not believe is worth incurring. The
perceived benefits are simply too low.”197 There is good reason for consumers
to adopt this attitude. To begin with, reading and understanding a privacy
notice requires reading and understanding a considerable amount of
information, some of which is couched in legalese.198 Imagine, for example:
George downloads the latest version of Adobe Reader®. Three accompanying
documents address Adobe’s rights to use personal information related to the
Reader’s download and use: the privacy policy (approximately 3 single-space
pages); the terms of use agreement (21 numbered paragraphs); and the license

193. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 283, 283 (Jane K. Winn ed., Markets and the Law Ser., 2006).
194. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 241 (1995).
195. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 116–17.
196. See Kang, supra note 12, at 1248 (“For numerous reasons, such as transaction costs,
individuals and information collectors do not generally negotiate and conclude express privacy
contracts before engaging in each and every cyberspace transaction.”). The failure to read
privacy policies is hardly surprising given the well-documented fact that consumers do not read
standard form contracts in general. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Commentary, Text Anxiety,
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (“[C]onsumers who are faced with the dense text of form
contracts characteristically respond by refusing to read.”). See also Hillman, supra note 193, at
289 (reporting survey results in which 44% of respondents did not read standard form contracts);
Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer
Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1993) (“It is no secret that consumers neither
read nor understand standard form contracts.”).
197. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 114.
198. Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 241.
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agreement (5 single-space pages).199 The latter two contain a number of terms
that require a significant knowledge of contract and intellectual property law to
fully interpret and understand.200 Reading these documents requires a
significant amount of time, and reading with full understanding is simply
beyond the capacity of those without the relevant legal knowledge.
Simplifying the notices to make reading them faster and easier will not yield
informed consent. Notices that attempt to provide enough information for
consent to be informed tend to be like the financial privacy notices one
receives from one’s bank—”long, complex, and filled with legal jargon.”201 In
general, “any notice that provides meaningful information about the actual uses
of information in the modern economy will necessarily impose costs on
consumers who must read and process the information.”202
B.

Informed Consent as a Practical Matter is Impossible

Even if consumers did read and understand privacy notices, they would not
obtain all the information necessary to give informed consent. The problem is
that information collected on one occasion for one purpose is typically
retained, analyzed, and distributed for a variety of other purposes in
unpredictable ways.203 The unpredictability of future uses makes informed
consent a practical impossibility.204 Daniel Solove emphasizes this point:
An individual may give out bits of information in different contexts, each
transfer appearing innocuous. However, the information can be aggregated
and could prove to be invasive of the private life when combined with other
information. . . . From the standpoint of each particular information
transaction, individuals will not have enough facts to make a truly informed
decision. The potential future uses of that information are too vast and
205
unknown to enable individuals to make the appropriate valuation.

C. The Overall Pattern of Free and Informed Consent Would Yield
Undesirable Tradeoffs
Suppose consumers could obtain and understand all relevant information.
The resulting overall pattern of consent would determine a tradeoff between
199. ADOBE READER, http://get.adobe.com/reader/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
200. See, e.g., id. Such clauses include a dispute resolution process, disclaimers that “Adobe
may change the Terms from time to time at its sole discretion,” and reserved rights: “You may
not assign (or grant a sublicense of) your rights to use the Software, grant a security interest in or
over your rights to use the Software, or otherwise transfer any part of your rights to use the
Software.” Id.
201. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 113.
202. Id. at 114.
203. Solove, supra note 76, at 1452.
204. See id. at 1426–27.
205. Id. at 1452.
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privacy and competing concerns. Is there any reason to think the tradeoff will
result in the socially optimal balance between informational privacy and
competing concerns? There would be reason to think if: 1) the giving or
withholding of consent signaled consumers’ preferences with regard to consent
to sellers; 2) sellers responded to these signals by altering their offerings to
reflect these values; 3) buyers responded by preferring products and services
consistent with their preference about consent to those inconsistent; 4) this
feedback mechanism yielded the socially optimal allocation of information.
But even if (1) through (3) are true, there is no reason to think (4) is. To take a
simple example, consider telephone books. Telephone books usefully facilitate
communication—the more so, the more numbers they contain. Suppose,
however, while most of us prefer telephone books with most other people’s
numbers in them, a majority of us also prefer not to have our individual
numbers listed. If consent was required before a number could be listed,
reasonably comprehensive telephone books would not exist, and we would lose
the aid to communication that most of us prefer. Similar suboptimal results are
likely in reality. “[T]here is often little individual incentive to participate in
the aggregation of information about people, [yet] an important collective good
results from the default participation of most people.”206
VI. COLLABORATE OR RESIST?
There are two ways to remedy a situation in which a norm lacks valuejustification: collaborate (retain the norm and change one’s values to make the
norm value-justified);207 or resist (replace the norm with a value-justified
one).208 Privacy advocates make a strong case against collaboration. They
emphasize that a significant degree of informational privacy is essential to
“intimacy, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, autonomy,
freedom,
self-development,
creativity,
independence,
imagination,
counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of thought, democracy, reputation, and
psychological well-being.”209 For anyone who assumes that a significant
degree of informational privacy is a necessary means to these ends, resistance
(creating value-justified norms) is the only reasonable option. The critical
question is what combination of these factors will most likely produce the
necessary value-justified informational norms.
I leave this question
unanswered. My goal has been to define the target, not explain how to hit it.
How to do so is a complex question requiring a detailed examination of how
best to approximate the four conditions defining ideal transaction conditions.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 95 (2001).
See supra pp. 1070–72.
Warner, supra note 21, at 14.
SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98.

